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Abstract 
This paper examines the interaction between science and society.  Society considers these 
interactions as vital to understand and reduce the uncertainty of the impact of scientific 
activity on society.  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the converse situation – 
whether the engagement of society with scientific activity creates uncertainty (or 
perceived risks) in terms of scientific practice, and whether there is potential for this 
engagement to create tensions in terms of the intelligent nature of scientific practice.  In 
order to achieve this, a cultural-historical, activity-based conceptualisation of intelligence 
is applied to scientific activity and its implications are discussed in terms of science-
society interactions. 
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1. Introduction 
The engagements between scientists and stakeholders from society go by many names – these 
include the “democratization of science”, the “socialization of science” and even sometimes “post-
normal science” (Turnpenny et al., 2011).  These engagements have become commonplace in 
many parts of the developed world, for example the USA (Kleinman, 1998), the UK (Te 
Kulve and Rip, 2011), Belgium (Van Oudheusden, 2011), and the Netherlands (Petersen et 
al., 2011).  The engagements have mainly centred on contentious scientific and technological 
issues, such as nanotechnology (Swierstra et al., 2011), environmental protection (Peterson et 
al., 2011), recombinant DNA, epidemiology and AIDS treatment (Kleinman, 1998), and 
energy policy and micro-electronics (Van Est, 2008). 
The need for these engagements is rooted in society’s concern that the products of science 
and technology that are largely ubiquitous in various aspects of societal life, are putting 
society at risk.  These risks are not always communicated by scientists to society.  Society 
therefore does not necessarily understand these risks, even though it has in a sense become 
the “object” of scientific endeavour. Societal concerns touch on a number of issues – obviously 
concerns for health and safety, but also socio-economic impact, environmental impact, and 
the ethical basis of research activity (Swierstra et al., 2011).   
Society’s main concern is therefore the risks associated with scientific activity.  The nature 
and conceptualisation of these risks are complex.  This emerging complexity challenges 
traditional views that science is predicable, controllable and calculable (Lövbrand et al., 2010).  
The complexity also relates to the diversity of values, contexts and perceptions in society. The 
                                               
1 . Prof Hugo Lotriet is the Head Research and Graduate Studies in the College of Science Engineering 
and Technology at the University of South Africa, Johannesburg.  Email: lotrihh@unisa.ac.za 
Lotriet 
30 
assessment of the implications of these risks therefore cannot simply be left to the judgment 
of scientists (Bijker et al., 2010). 
Concurrent with these societal concerns, is the loss of credibility of science in society 
(Lövbrand et al., 2010).  Society now exhibits an attitude of “sceptical wait-and-see” rather 
than enthusiasm in terms of scientific endeavour (Swierstra et al., 2011).  This has led to 
society’s growing expectation that scientists should “justify their knowledge claims” to a wider 
audience (Lövbrand et al., 2010).  
Engagements between science and society have mainly been initiated in order to enable 
society to understand the societal risks involved in the development of science and 
technological artefacts, and to collaboratively develop ethical guidelines to ensure that science 
does not expose society to risks that it is not willing to tolerate (see for example Bijker et al., 
2007).  The ideal is that these engagements will lead (at least) to expressions of the diversity 
of values, arguments, assumptions and meanings emanating from society that should inform 
science and its governance (Lövbrand et al., 2010).  This expectation is partly reflected in the 
metaphors mentioned at the start of the paper that have science as their object.  
The recent national debate about nanotechnology in the Netherlands is interesting in terms 
of the scale on which it was undertaken.  The intention was literally to engage with as large a 
part of the Dutch population as possible at a national level.  A brief discussion of this debate 
as a case study serves as a point of departure for this paper. 
With the Dutch debate on nanotechnology as a point of departure, this paper examines the 
interaction between scientists and society in literature in order to understand how it could be 
conceptualised, what the associated challenges are that need to be addressed, and what the 
implications are for intelligent scientific activity.  
The involvement of society in shaping scientific activity has become a given. This is evident 
from the current state of development and evolution of societal dynamics mentioned in this 
paper.  Latour (2004) argues that the political power associated with the notion of science as 
accessible only by scientists (he uses the analogy of the Platonic cave) while society languishes 
in ignorance, does not apply anymore. There still is some evidence of scientific stakeholders 
clinging to the outdated conception, sometimes referred to as the “Information Deficit 
Model” (Van Est, 2008).  In terms of the metaphor of Plato’s cave as used by Latour, anyone 
can exit the cave and become enlightened and no one would languish in the darkness of the 
cave by choice.  There is therefore no justification or need for society to rely on scientists as 
sole intermediaries for access to the sciences.    
This conceptualisation of public access to the sciences creates various uncertainties (risks) in 
terms of understanding its implications for and impact on scientific activity. From a 
sociotechnical perspective it would be expected that in any interaction of substance between 
two domains (such as science and society), the outcome will be that both domains will be 
affected (and would undergo changes) as a result of the interaction.   
In this instance it could be expected that both society and science would change as a result of 
their engagement.  Literature reports quite extensively on how improved risk evaluation 
frameworks have enabled society to make more intelligent and informed decisions about the 
risks related to scientific work (see for instance Bijker 2009a and 2009b). However, it is less 
clear on the impact of societal engagement on scientists and their activities. This paper, 
written by an author who is situated within a scientific context therefore focuses on this more 
neglected side by reflecting on the potential implications of science-society engagement for 
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science and scientific activity. Specifically, the paper reflects on the notion of intelligence and 
intelligent scientific activity and whether interaction between science and society has the 
potential to create risks (or uncertainties) related to such intelligent scientific activity.  This 
focus relates to the theme that constitutes the context of this paper, i.e. the 2014 mini-
conference held around the concern that “human intelligence” is under siege and is becoming 
a scarce resource in academic institutions.  
Within this broader concern the paper specifically focuses on scientific activity (a significant 
part of the activity at academic institutions) and what tensions (i.e. battles) the engagement 
with society could create in terms of intelligent scientific activity.  Battle metaphors have 
indeed been used to describe science-society interactions. For example Kleinman (1998) 
refers to the heated debates in the nineties (especially in the USA) on who legitimately can 
make pronouncements on science, as the “science wars”.  
The paper therefore does not focus on the nature of the boundaries and boundary-crossing 
for the scientific domain, but on conceptualising this relatively new, but seemingly permanent 
arrangement of societal engagement with science. The aim is to enable a better understanding 
of what constitutes intelligent science-society interaction and by implication intelligent 
scientific activity as well as a better understanding of the potential uncertainties (i.e. risks) 
involved that could create tensions and conflicts.  In this regard the paper proposes a cultural-
historical framework for intelligent action as a conceptual basis for intelligent scientific 
activity.  This framework provides a lens to identify specific areas of potential conflict 
(battlefields) that could manifest in science-society interactions.     
The paper therefore proposes conceptions of science, its role in society and a cultural-
historical notion of intelligence that enable the visualisation of tensions related to science-
society interactions and scientific activity.  In order to do this, the paper proposes a 
conceptualisation that draws mainly on discourses from two disciplines – firstly, 
sociotechnical literature to provide a conceptualisation of science-technology interaction and 
secondly Activity Theory literature - essentially a continuation of Russian social psychology 
that has its roots in the ideas of Vygotsky (1980). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. As a point of departure the paper provides a brief 
description of the recent national Dutch nanotechnology debate as an example of science-
society interaction. The paper then proceeds to discuss concepts and issues reported on in 
literature that relate to science-society interactions.  After this, the paper focusses specifically 
on scientific activity and discusses how science is becoming re-conceptualised as a result of 
science-society interaction. The extent of potential involvement and associated modes of 
interaction available to society are investigated.  The author proposes a cultural-historical 
(activity-based) notion of intelligence for use to visualise potential areas of tension and 
conflicts related to science-society interaction and by implication related to scientific activity. 
A number of limitations to this paper need to be stated at the outset.  Firstly, for the purpose 
of this paper the notion of science is the “harder” notion of natural sciences, engineering and 
technology.  The paper does not attempt to engage with the interesting discourses on the 
narrowing of the gap between natural sciences and social sciences and humanities, although 
the perspectives provided by the author are mostly social and socio-technical in nature. This 
is because the researcher’s own background is in Information Systems, which is essentially a 
social discipline.  Secondly, the paper does not attempt to provide an exhaustive list or 
discussion of all instances of science-society interaction.  As previously stated, the single case 
reported on serves only as a point of departure to arrive at a more conceptual discussion on 
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the nature of science-society interaction, scientific activity and intelligence. It is recognised 
that much richness could be added by examining other instances of science-society 
interaction in future research.  The paper does not attempt to provide any holistic picture of 
either the battles for intelligence in academic institutions or contributing factors to the bigger 
discourses on the nature of “good” science.   
2. Point of departure:  The Dutch national debate on nanotechnology  
The Dutch has a history of experimentation with social engagement with science.  Some 
notable examples include a nuclear technology debate and a subsequent discussion around 
energy policy, in addition to discourses on genetic engineering and micro-electronics (Van 
Est, 2008). 
The Commissie Maatschappelijke Dialoog Nanotechnologie (CieMDN) was created in 2009 
as an independent commission with a mandate to facilitate national discourse in the 
Netherlands around nanotechnology.  Interestingly five of the nine members (including both 
the chair and the vice-chair) of the commission were from Dutch Universities (Commissie 
Maatschappelike Dialoog Nanotechnologie, 2011). Although government initiated 
CieMDN on the advice of other institutions (notably the Dutch “Gezondheidsraad”), it was 
structured to be independent of government mainly in order to ensure a good public 
reputation for the body (Bijker et al., 2010).   
The commission started off with a completely open agenda in terms of expected outcomes 
(Bijker et al. 2010, op. cit.), after which it consulted widely to establish the themes of the 
dialogue. An open invitation was sent to stakeholders in society for project proposals on ways 
to mediate the dialogue (the CieMDN did not do this themselves) (CieMDN, 2011). As 
resources were limited, prioritisation between projects had to be implemented in order to stay 
within the budget (Bijker et al., 2010). 
The process could not assume informed opinions due to the early phase of development of 
nanotechnology.  Therefore, the project was deliberately executed in phases – i.e. provision of 
information, awareness activities and finally discourses on nanotechnology, with the first two 
being considered conditions for successful execution of the third phase (Bijker et al., 2010, op. 
cit.).   
The project that took place from March 2009 to December 2010 ultimately involved a large 
diversity of interest groups and used a significant variety of methods to engage with these 
interest groups.  These included “old and new media”, teaching materials for school children, 
theatre, art, television, exhibitions, mobile nanotechnology labs allowing citizens to interact 
with nanotechnology, YouTube animations, general use of the Internet for interaction (e.g. 
through games for the young) as well as philosophical “vignettes”, debates, focus groups and 
workshops.  The purpose of the engagements was both to inform and to get opinions of 
citizens (Bijker et al., 2010, op. cit.).   
A core finding on the basis of this dialogue is that society is not against science, but requires 
science to proceed with care (CieMDN, 2011).   
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3. Conceptualisation of Science-Society interactions 
3.1 Assumptions and historical developments 
Elements of the conceptualisation of the relationship between scientists and society derive 
from the ancient Greeks.  Nowotny (2003) points out that Plato held strong views on the 
contrast between those who understand science (to be held in esteem as aristocracy) and the 
process of the formation of public opinion which he considered to be “mob-based” and 
irrational, thus by implication advocating a strong boundary between the domains of science 
and public opinion. 
Bijker (2010) departs from the assumption that the mutual interactions between science, 
technology and society mean that current day societies are “thoroughly technological” and that 
present day technology is “pervasively cultural”.  He traces the notion of technological culture 
as the (necessary) culmination in the evolution of notions around the interaction of 
technology with society (starting with a single technological artefact as unit of analysis and 
progressing through “technological systems” and “sociotechnical ensembles” to “technological 
culture”) (Bijker, 2010).  Society has to become aware that science and technology changes the 
core fabric of society – practices, values, goals, etc. (Swierstra et al., 2011).  Interestingly 
Bijker et al. (2010) even provide the example that science and technology impacts on 
metaphors in poetry and literature.  
The notion that current society is technological is also supported by Barry (2001) who argues 
that this should be mainly understood as society’s preoccupation with technology-related 
challenges. The notion of the technological society and its implications for various aspects of 
societal activity have indeed become a widely researched topic – see for examples Winner 
(1992) on democracy in a technological society, or De Raath (1997) on the humane 
management of organisations in a technological society. 
If the nature of current societal culture is assumed to be inherently technological, it would 
consequently be subject to science and technology mediated vulnerability (Bijker et al., 2010).  
This vulnerability should not necessarily be construed as negative, but rather as inevitable and 
the vulnerability could refer to either society and humanity or technological systems.  Indeed, 
vulnerability is a pre-condition for creativity and innovation (Bijker, 2009).  
3.2 Reflections on the process of engagement: Pre-conditions for a successful societal 
dialogue 
It is important to prepare stakeholders prior to engagement in order to enable a meaningful 
engagement (Te Kulve and Rip, 2011). This would counter any claims that the public would 
be unable to participate in the engagement because members of the public are uninformed (as 
was claimed by scientists in the past) (Kleinman, 1998). This is situated within the greater 
context of a general realization by many governments of a need for scientifically “empowered” 
citizens (Mohr, 2011).  Mohr also points out that the conceptualisation of the notion of 
science-interaction by the mediators of these interactions would produce different “versions” 
of the public – e.g. actively engaged partners in dialogue vs. passive future users.  From this 
perspective the openness and diversity of mediation projects deliberately employed by the 
Dutch nanotechnology debate are interesting. Conley (2011) extends the concept by arguing 
that scientists should also be prepared in order to become good “engagement agents”. 
A significant part of the Dutch nano-debate revolved around enabling imagination (or 
visualisation) in order to enable society to understand in concrete ways the impact of science 
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and technology on their lives. Indeed, in the instance of the Dutch debate, public reaction 
became more nuanced after the provision of information and the preparation for the debate 
(Swierstra et al., 2011). 
In the case of a developing field of science or technology, preparation for a meaningful 
interaction with society becomes challenging, as the science/technology itself is still only 
manifest in “expectations, plans and promises” of stakeholders such as scientists, government, 
investors and others (Swierstra et al., 2011, op. cit.).   
3.3 Reflections on aspects of the organisation of participation 
There is inevitably a need for organisations to act as intermediaries and to facilitate these 
dialogues, thereby providing havens of confidentiality for scientists to engage without bearing 
the burden of the representation of interests (Bijker et al., 2010). A brief discussion of these 
intermediaries follows. 
3.3.1 Intermediary organisations 
The nature and role of intermediary organisations are considered significant and the role of 
the CieMDN has been described in Section 2 of this paper.  Interestingly, in the instances 
studied for this paper, the organisations identified or created to be the intermediaries are not 
universities (although the CieMDN was governed by a majority of academics).  The outputs 
of these organisations are actionable rather than scholarly, i.e. advisory reports rather than 
journal or conference papers. Such advisory reports are considered useful for policy 
formulation and can serve as a basis for discussions in a political context (Bijker et al., 2010). 
The notion of reason as the ultimate basis for selecting views or arguments remains central to 
the notion of deliberative democracy.  In this regard a risk that needs to be managed is the 
potential impact of unspoken expectations of sponsors (i.e. significant stakeholders that play 
roles in defining the structure and processes of the interactions) such as government or large 
players in industry (Lövbrand et al., 2010).    
An important aspect of the role played by the mediating organisation is the preservation of 
ambiguity.  The future direction of science and technology, being a social construct, is not 
pre-determined and can only be expressed as a series of imagined scenarios.  These need to be 
managed not to go to extremes (“hype” vs. “horror”) (Swierstra et al., 2011). In this regard an 
example of undemocratic behaviour in these mediating organisations is provided by Volonté 
(in Bijker et al., 2010) who recounts that CieMDN orchestrated aspects of the Dutch 
nanodebate by sourcing opposing expert scientific opinions in instances where there was a 
feeling that contributions by scientific experts in a certain area were unbalanced. The 
mediating body’s implied imposition of values and norms regarding public participation has 
been argued to be problematic, as it could impact on the whole notion of public participation 
(Van Oudheusden, 2011).  
3.3.2 Sponsoring organisations: The example of the “Gezondheidsraad” 
I want to pause briefly to reflect on the Gezondheidsraad, because it is central to the 
interactions between scientists and society in the Netherlands.  It is the body that by law is 
mandated to provide scientific advice to government, and in fact it is largely because of the 
recommendation of the Gezondheidsraad amongst others that the nanodebate was 
undertaken in the Netherlands. It does its work through committees that largely consist of 
academics from the Netherlands and abroad.   
Bijker et al. (2009b) go to pains to explain the complex nature of the Dutch 
Gezondheidsraad.  The organisation varies in focus, composition, size of network involved, 
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boundaries and temporality of the scientific information collated and provided to 
stakeholders.  It is independent of government and allows for confidentiality in scientific 
discourse. It makes scientific knowledge accessible for social engagement and use (Ibid.) 
Above all, the authors stress that it has retained scientific authority in an era where this 
authority has become eroded.  Its role is mainly to imbue its societal initiatives with authority 
– something that Bijker et al. (2009b, op. cit.) consider to be an interesting paradox in an age 
where scientific organisations have largely lost authority within society. A comparative 
organisation exists in the USA – the US National Academy of Sciences.  
An important aspect of these organisations is space they provide for debate amongst scientists 
and other experts.  Notable in this regard is the premium placed on the confidentiality of 
these deliberations (Bijker et al., 2010; Bijker et al., 2009b).  The confidentiality is intended 
to allow robust debates around scientific controversies without the need to publicly represent 
any established interests.  It also aims to allow for a suitable translation of science in a way 
that makes it accessible for society. (In a sense this renders these organisations effectively 
undemocratic).  This adherence to confidentiality could be contrasted to the many voices in 
literature calling for a complete openness to all of science, scientific objects and structures 
(Bijker et al., 2010).   
3.3.3 The role of government 
Government inevitably plays a significant role in science-society interaction.  The nature of 
the involvement of government includes the legislation that brings into being organising 
bodies and sponsoring organisations such as the Gezondheidsraad or the US National 
Academy of Sciences (Bijker et al., 2009b), even though care is taken to ensure that these 
ultimately operate independently.  Government ultimately creates the policies that govern 
responsible use of science and technology. Similarly, policy is seen as one of the main 
instruments to regulate the outcomes of the negotiations between science and society (Bijker 
et al., 2010) and to govern the responsible use of science and technology. 
Society inevitably expects government to play a significant role in managing risk. One of the 
recommendations emanating from the Dutch nanotechnology dialogue was that government 
should show visible commitment to society to enforce the “agreement” between society and 
science (Swierstra et al., 2011). 
3.3.4 Specific risks and issues in the process of participation that need to be managed 
If the processes followed in science-society interactions are completely divergent with no 
standard to evaluate the legitimacy of the responses to these interactions, there is no 
guarantee that the outcomes of these processes are better than it would have been if any other 
process (or indeed no process) had been followed (Lövbrand et al., 2010). 
There is a potential impact of unspoken expectations of sponsors such as government or large 
players in industry that needs to be managed (Lövbrand et al., 2010). The need for rational 
argument and collaborative participation is therefore not necessarily universally shared by 
participants in the reality of science-society engagement.  Personal expression of power, 
modes of communication and structural cultural and other constricting factors may indeed 
play a significant role (Van Oudheusden, 2011). 
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4. The impact of science-society interaction on science and scientific activity 
4.1 The re-conceptualisation of scientific activity  
The “standard view of science” (Bijker et al., 2009b) (or Information Deficit Model, as 
previously mentioned) is not compatible with the socialization of science.  This essentially 
binary view entails that method is everything and that good science can be clearly 
distinguished from bad science (and concurrently that scientists are clearly separated and 
distinguishable from non-scientists) (Ibid.).  Essentially, as facts are “indisputable”, it implies a 
“one-way” engagement between science and society, with science providing the solid factual 
basis on which society can proceed. Furthermore this view does not require science to be 
normative, as facts (with nature as the impartial judge of their accuracy) are neutral. The 
traditional view assumes that only scientists can make pronouncements regarding scientific 
matters (Kleinman, 1998). 
Instead, scientific activity has become recognised as being socially constructed. This has been 
one of the core arguments of the Science and Technology Studies (STS) discourses amongst 
sociologists of science (Bijker et al., 2010) for a number of decades.  In fact, Stengers (2011) 
implies that science is not only socially constructed, but there is even space for the course of 
science to be influenced by social advocacy.  Recognizing the social construction of science 
and technology raises the argument that there would be little to distinguish scientific 
knowledge from other socially constructed types of knowledge, and that therefore the 
importance of scientific knowledge has become downgraded (Bijker et al., 2010).  Issues 
regarding the cornerstones of scientific knowledge (such as its peer review processes) create 
further concerns about the nature of scientific knowledge - even within the scientific 
community (De Beer and Roux, 2010) - and contribute to the dilemma of how to distinguish 
scientific knowledge from other types of knowledge.   
Recognizing the social nature of science also means that the conceptualisation of a binary 
relation between the scientist and the member of society is replaced with a notion of a social 
network of actors involved in the activities of science and influencing its direction and 
outcomes - see for instance Latour (2004).     The functionality of boundaries is also 
redefined.  Instead of being seen as a separation, a boundary becomes a zone of co-ordination 
(e.g. between science and politics) (Bijker, 2009 on the role of scientific advising) resulting in 
“linking up various domains” (Bijker et al., 2009b).  
Bijker (2009, op. cit.) argues strongly for a conceptualisation of science as a societal enterprise.  
He indicates that such a conceptual shift would result in the adoption of more useful 
metaphors than those currently employed in the discussion of interaction between scientists 
and society. The example he provides, is that there should be a shift from the notions of 
“quantification, optimization and management” to, for instance, the notion of “vulnerability”, 
which resonates more closely with the human condition. 
Furthermore, as facts are no longer indisputable but instead are social constructs (Bijker et al., 
2010), and scientists are correspondingly no longer undisputed authorities on science in 
society, science inevitably needs to become normative and has to reflect on the ethics of its 
activities that produce the knowledge constituting its outcomes. This is arguably a relatively 
uncontroversial outcome of the engagement between science and society (potentially more 
controversial outcomes are pointed out in sections 4.2 and 5 of this paper). 
Risk of the engagement between science and society  
TD, 11(2), November 2015, Special edition, pp. 29-42. 
37 
4.2 The potential extent of societal interaction with scientific activity and the modes of 
interaction available to society 
The outcome of the engagement processes in terms of impacting on scientific activity appears 
to be indirect, rather than direct – for instance, through impacting on policy formulation that 
regulates scientific behaviour (Kleinman, 1998). 
However, Kleinman (op. cit.) provides evidence of a spectrum of potential levels of 
engagement by society with science.  For instance, engagement on ethics, values and 
priorities as “soft issues” are fairly widely accepted and practiced in various countries.  
Engagement by society on scientific methods, the production of scientific knowledge and the 
evaluation of this knowledge could be considered contentious and could well meet with some 
resistance by scientists. However, it might hold more significant potential in terms of the 
reform of scientific knowledge argued for by for instance De Beer and Roux (2010). These 
potential areas of engagement are summarised in Table 1. 
 Direct influence by the society on 
scientific activity 
Indirect influence by society on 
scientific activity 
 
Potential “hard” involvement 
[more drastic and possibly more 
controversial] 
Examples: 
Prescriptions to scientists regarding 
methods 
Participation in knowledge creation 
Participation in the evaluation of 
knowledge through more extensive 
peer review processes 
Citizen-initiated science projects 
Societal participation in setting the 
agendas for core scientific activity 
Examples: 
Policies on methods and knowledge 
generation 
Statutory requirements for scientific 
methods, practitioners, access to the 
scientific domain 
Creation of expert 
organisations/bodies that contribute 
to and influence science and scientific 
practice 
 
Potential “soft” involvement 
[less drastic and more socially 
acceptable] 
Examples: 
Citizen participation in scientific 
boards deliberating on ethics, values 
and social impact of science on society 
Citizen participation in scientific 
boards providing requirements and 
priorities of society that science needs 
to meet 
Society-involved participation in 
setting the agenda for soft issues 
related to scientific activity 
Examples: 
Policies on ethics and values 
Structures of mediation between 
science and society 
Agency related to structures of 
mediation 
Table 1:  Schematized view of potential  societal  involvement in science (Adopted 
and expanded on the basis  of  the basic categories of Kleinman, 1998) 
5. Intelligence as a cultural-historical phenomenon 
What remains, is to consider the notion of intelligence and its potential tension points (battle 
fields), as these relate to science-society interaction and to scientific activity. 
I would argue that a conceptualisation of intelligence that is compatible with the notion of a 
socially constructed scientific enterprise should be the point of departure.  In addition, I 
would argue for a notion of intelligence that is more than simply a metaphoric transfer of the 
notion of individual cognitive capability to a societal level.  Such a notion should allow for a 
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systemic consideration of intelligence in relation to the interaction between science and 
society. 
I propose that the notion of a distributed intelligence (also sometimes referred to as 
distributed cognition) embedded in cultural-historical activity approaches, offers such an 
option. This notion of distributed intelligence has been applied mainly in educational context 
to conceptualise, for instance, education design (Pea, 1993) and distributed leadership in 
education (Spillane et. al., 2004).   Engeström et al. (1995) have applied this notion to the 
work and activity of experts in settings such as local government and factories. 
By applying the notion of distributed work-based intelligence to scientific activity and its 
interaction with society, a conceptualisation can be created of potential tension points and 
uncertainties (risks) associated with societal interaction with the work of scientists. This is set 
out in the following paragraphs.  
Cole and Engeström (1993) argue that intelligence has always been considered by 
psychologists to be distributed/collective in nature (since Wundt).  They point out that even 
Wundt argued that the cognitive functioning of individuals can only be understood in the 
context of “historical contingent phenomena” that are not amenable to scientific 
experimentation (Cole and Engeström, op. cit.; Mischel, 1970).  This is in contrast to the 
widely held conception of intelligence as residing primarily in the minds of individuals (Pea, 
1993).   
The notions regarding human activity systems and cognition were originally developed by 
Russian social psychologists (see Vygotsky, 1980; Leont’ev, 1978) as part of understanding 
human activity systems in the context of historical cultural activity.  Ultimately activity 
theorists argue that the loci of human cognition are visible only in human activity (Pea, 
1993).  The diagram in Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of a human activity 
system. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Conceptualisation of the structure of human activity (Adopted from 
Engeström, 2001) 
The schematic representation in Figure 1 shows the main elements of any human activity 
system.  These include the traditional main elements in the Vygotskian tradition of a subject 
interacting with an object through mediating artefacts in order to achieve an outcome, which 
inevitably is some transformation of the object.  Later additions by activity theorists relate to 
an enabling context for these main elements.  The elements of the enabling context constitute 
Outcome 
Division of 
labour 
Community Rules 
Mediating artefacts 
Subject Object 
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the rules, communities and division of labour that support the activities taking place.  
Cultural-historical activity theory assumes a large-scale stability or slow evolution of activity 
systems (Engeström, 2001) through the resolution of tensions and stresses inherent in the 
activity system. 
In terms of the conceptualisation of science-society interaction (and of science itself) as 
socially constructed, it can be argued that this conceptualisation of an activity system would 
also be applicable to these areas of human activity.  
This conceptualisation assumes intelligence to be expressed as action, rather than as a “state 
of being” (Pea, 1993).  Pea (op. cit.) describes this type of intelligence as follows: 
The focus in thinking about distributed intelligence is not on intelligence as an abstract 
property or quantity residing in the minds, organizations or objects.  In its primary 
sense here, intelligence is manifest in activity that connects means and ends through 
achievements  (Pea, 1993: 50).  
The various elements of the activity system may be considered to be stabilised expressions of 
intelligence, demonstrating activity-based “patterns of distributed intelligence” (Ibid.).  The 
person does not disappear, but the boundaries between the person and human activity are 
more diffuse.  This representation highlights external expressions of intelligence within the 
human activity system. 
 Similarly, intelligence-related tensions could be associated with any of the elements or 
between elements that would obstruct the manifestation of intelligent connections between 
means and ends – these typically constitute the manifestation of intelligence-related “battles” 
over the interaction between science and society (and ultimately also reflecting on scientific 
activity) referred to in the introductory paragraphs of this paper. 
Some examples of potential intelligence-related tensions in science-society engagement 
becoming visible in terms of an activity system are listed in Table 2. 
Element of human activity 
system for science-society 
engagement 
Example of potential tensions in science-society interaction (drawn from 
earlier arguments in this paper) 
Object and its 
transformation 
Discourses around priorities, objectives and risks of scientific endeavour for 
society 
Tools Diversity vs. non-diversity of engagement mechanisms 
Subject Credibility of organisations initiating society-science interactions 
Rules Role of experts 
Transparency of deliberations vs. confidentiality 
Final decision on validity of outcomes of science-society interaction 
Division of labour Final arbiter on validity of outcomes of science-society interaction 
Communities Vested interests and power bases of selected communities involved in science-
society interaction 
Representativeness vs. non-representativeness of participatory groups from 
society 
Table 2:  Examples of potential  tensions in a human activity system for science-
society engagement 
 
Examples of intelligence-related tensions externally expressed in the considered human 
activity system for scientific activity resulting from science-society engagement, are listed in 
Table 3. 
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Element of human activity 
system for scientific activity 
Example of potential tensions in scientific activity (drawn from previous 
arguments in this paper) 
Object and its transformation Society and science may differ on the objectives, priorities and direction of 
science, which would then need to be debated. 
Tools Traditional tools of scientific knowledge production vs. new tools (e.g. 
expanded peer review mechanisms) 
Subject Traditional scientists engaging with scientific knowledge creation vs. 
expanded notions of the subjects of scientific knowledge creation 
Rules Managing science as a business vs. managing science as a societal project 
Establishing of stable “rules” governing science-society interactions as well as 
rules regarding the evaluation of quality of interactions. 
Confidentiality of scientific discourse vs. transparency of all engagements 
Division of labour Society having a share in the evaluation of scientific knowledge 
Communities Exponents of the traditional view of science vs. novel views  
Communities with vested interests 
Table 3:  Examples of potential  tensions in a human activity system for science-
society interaction 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Engagement between science and society holds the potential for science to expand its base 
and context, and for society to reduce the uncertainties associated with the impact of 
scientific activity on society. 
The intrusion of public participants into spheres which until fairly recently have been 
considered the exclusive domain of scientists (Kleinman, 1998), does not in itself pose a 
threat to intelligent scientific practice.  In fact, it allows science to exit Stenger’s (2011) 
“groove” by widening the scientific discourse from one  limited to participation by scientists 
and like-minded parties elsewhere in society, to one that involves diverse societal 
participation (which has the beneficial potential of slowing down science).  
Science-society interaction could support the initiation of some of the mechanisms proposed 
by De Beer and Roux (2010) for improving the evaluation of scientific knowledge. For 
instance, it could allow for more extensive peer evaluation of scientific results than simply 
evaluation by other like-minded scientists and interest groups - thus moving closer to the 
notion of an “ecology of peer review”.  In addition, science-society interaction resonates 
strongly with the notion of discursive practices at an early stage of scientific endeavour.  
Finally, it has the potential to make scientific activity more visible and transparent. 
A cultural-historical perspective of intelligence allows for a systematic envisioning of the 
manifestation of tensions in the human activity systems that comprise science-society 
interaction and socially constructed scientific activity – thus allowing for a systematic 
understanding of the “battles for intelligence” that would potentially be involved in the 
evolution of these systems. 
Risk of the engagement between science and society  
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